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INTRODUCTION

R

ecent Supreme Court cases have recognized the science underlying
the common-sense notion that children are not "little adults." Their
brains function in a completely different manner than those of adults. In
2005, the Court abolished the juvenile death penalty and recognized the
neuroscience underlying the claim that those under the age of eighteen
should not be subject to the ultimate punishment due to the fundamental
immaturity of their brains. 1 Later cases, discussed in depth below,
followed similar reasoning in abolishing life without parole for nonhomicides for juvenile offenders 2 and in holding that juvenile offenders
cannot be subjected to a mandatory life sentence even for homicide. 3 In
each of these cases, the Court applied an Eighth Amendment analysis. 4 In
contrast, cases assessing the constitutionality of procedures employed in
juvenile delinquency courts employ the "fundamental fairness" test
dictated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5

1

Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573-74, 578 (2004).

2

Graham v. Florida, 540 U.S. 48, 68-69, 80 (2010).

3

Millerv. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2482 (2012).

4

See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 ("[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing
scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.");
Graham, 540 U.S. at 79 ("Terrance Graham's sentence guarantees he will die in prison
without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no matter what he might do to
demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not representative of his true
character, even if he spends the next half century attempting to atone for his crimes and
learn from his mistakes. The State has denied him any chance to later demonstrate that he
is fit to rejoin society based solely on a non-homicide crime that he committed while he
was a child in the eyes of the law. This the Eighth Amendment does not permit."); Roper,
125 U.S. at 578 ("The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death
penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.").
5

See McKeiverv. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1971) ("We do not mean by
this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a
criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing
must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."); In re Gault, 387
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The first cases to evaluate the constitutionality of the procedures
used to transfer juveniles to adult court utilized a due process framework. 6
This was consistent with the analysis of early cases that reviewed the
procedures used in delinquency court. 7 This article argues that, in light of
the Court's holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller, direct file procedures
must also be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. As Justice Fortas
noted in Kent, the "decision as to waiver of jurisdiction and transfer of the
matter to the [adult criminal court] was potentially as important to
petitioner as the difference between five years' confinement and a death
sentence." 8 In most states, juvenile jurisdiction ends, at the latest, at the
child's twenty-first birthday. In Florida, for example, the maximum
sentence that can be imposed on a juvenile is commitment to a juvenile
commitment program for the length of time applicable to an adult, or until
the child's nineteenth birthday, whichever is shorter. 9 Therefore, a sixteenU.S. 1, 31-59 (1967) (applying due process analysis to determine what procedures were
required to protect the rights of juveniles charged in delinquency court; due process was
held to require adequate written notice of the charges, the right to counsel, the right to
confront and cross-examine the State's witnesses, and the right to remain silent); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555, 564-65 (1966) (assessing the constitutionality of
judicial transfer of juvenile to adult court by stating: "We do not mean by this to indicate
that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or
even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure
up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."); see also Gallegos v. Colorado,
370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962) ("The youth of the petitioner, the long detention, the failure to
send for his parents, the failure immediately to bring him before the judge of the Juvenile
Court, the failure to see to it that he had the advice of a lawyer or a friend-all these
combine to make us conclude that the formal confession on which this conviction was
obtained in violation of due process."); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600-01(1948)
(holding that Due Process Clause did not permit admission of a statement of a fifteenyear-old that was taken under circumstances that did not comport with fundamental
fairness).
6

See supra, note 5.

7

See Kent, 383 U.S. at 555, 564-65.

8

Id. at 546.

9

See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 985.455(3) (West 2013).
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year old facing a charge of armed burglary of a dwelling can be sentenced
to a juvenile commitment facility until his nineteenth birthday if the case
is filed in juvenile court. In stark contrast, if the juvenile is charged as an
adult, he faces several decades in prison, perhaps as many as seventy
years. 10 Given that the result of an adult charge could be the equivalent of
life in prison-and in light of the developmental neuroscience recognized
by the Supreme Court-procedures used to transfer youth to adult criminal
courts must comport with the Eighth Amendment.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND PURPORTED PURPOSE OF JUVENILE
COURTS

This article addresses cases that are transferred from juvenile
delinquency court to adult criminal court. Delinquency proceedings are
proceedings in juvenile court in which children are charged with
"delinquent acts"-the juvenile equivalent of an adult crime. In most
states, the law provides that delinquent acts are not crimes. 11 While every
state has a juvenile court system today, the role of juvenile court has
changed over time; "[a]t the dawn of the twentieth century, progressive
reformers applied the new theories of social control to the new ideas about
childhood and created a social welfare alternative to criminal courts to
treat criminal and noncriminal misconduct by youth." 12 After several

10

In Florida, armed burglary of a dwelling is punishable by life in prison for an
adult. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02 (West 2011). A case currently pending before the
Florida Supreme Court illustrates the potential sentences faced by youth charged as
adults. See Gridine v. State, 89 So. 3d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). In Gridine, a
fourteen-year-old was sentenced to seventy years without parole for an attempted armed
robbery committed with a twelve-year-old. Id. at 910. Under Florida law, he will not be
eligible for parole until he is seventy-seven. Id.; see also Erik Eckholm, Juveniles Facing
Lifelong Terms Despite Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2014, at Al.
11

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 985.35(6) (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN.§ 15-11-606
(West 2014); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 380.1 (McKinney 2007).
12

Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MlNN. L. REV. 691,
691 (1991).
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decades of reform, delinquency courts now closely resemble adult
criminal courts. 13 Barry Feld has identified three types of reform affecting
the juvenile court system: jurisdictional, jurisprudential, and procedural. 14
Recent years have seen an increase in society's desire to criminalize the
conduct of children. While penalties have become harsher and juvenile
sanctions have become more like criminal sanctions, juvenile courts are
not required to provide children with the same protections afforded to
adult defendants. According to Feld, "[a]lthough theoretically, juvenile
courts' procedural safeguards closely resemble those of criminal courts, in
reality, the justice routinely afforded juveniles is lower than the minimum
insisted upon for adults." 15 Feld argues:
The substantive and procedural convergence between
juvenile and criminal courts eliminates virtually all of the
differences in strategies of social control between youths
and adults. As a result, no reason remains to maintain a
separate juvenile court whose only distinction is its
persisting procedural deficiencies. Yet, even with the
juvenile court's transformation from an informal,
rehabilitative agency into a scaled-down criminal court, it
continues to operate virtually unreformed. The juvenile
court's continued existence despite these changes reflects
an ambivalence about children and their control, and
provides an opportunity to re-examine basic assumptions
about the nature and competence of young people. 16
Historically, youth in delinquency court were not afforded all of
the protections given to adults facing criminal charges. 17 This was because

13

Id.

14

Id. at 692.

ls Id.
16
17

Id. at 692-93.

See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967) ("The early reformers were appalled by
adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long prison

2015]

Transfer ofJuvenile Offenders

57

juvenile court was seen as a way for the state to step in where children
were engaging in socially unacceptable behavior, often due to lack of
supervision at home. 18 Some have noted a distinct class element to early
juvenile courts, arguing that such courts were a way for society to exercise
control over "lower-class" youth. 19 A report submitted by the Cook
County (Illinois) Bar Association to the Illinois state legislature in support
of the creation of the first juvenile court stated that:
The fundamental idea of the Juvenile Court Law is that the
State must step in and exercise guardianship over a child
found under such adverse social or individual conditions as
develop crime. . . It proposes a plan whereby he may be
treated, not as a criminal, or legally charged with a crime,
but as a ward of the state. 20
Over time, however, the courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, began to recognize that the ideal of kindly juvenile judges who
used their wide discretion to help at-risk children was far from the reality

sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals. They were profoundly convinced
that society's duty to the child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone. They
believed that society's role was not to ascertain whether the child was 'guilty' or
'innocent,' but 'What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in
his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.' The
child-essentially good, as they saw it-was to be made 'to feel that he is the object of
(the state's) care and solicitude,' not that he was under arrest or on trial. The rules of
criminal procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable.").
18

History and Philosophy of the Juvenile Court, in FLA. Juv. LAW AND PRACTICE 16 (11th ed. 2009) [hereinafter FLA. Juv. LAW AND PRACTICE].
19

Id. ("Early juvenile law generally grew from citizen concern for children who,
lacking parental control, discipline, and supervision, were coming before the criminal
court for truancy, begging, homelessness, and petty criminal activity. There were distinct
social phenomena that contributed to these problems, including a large population of
children from broken families in the aftermath of the Civil War, latchkey children of
parents who were unable to provide supervision during long work hours, lack of child
care, and lack of free or compulsory education for children.").

°FLA. Juv. LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 18, at 1-3.

2

Virginia Journal of Criminal Law

58

[Vol. 3:52

faced every day by children in delinquency court. 21 In the seminal case of
In re Gault, the United States Supreme Court stated:
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that
unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure. In
1937, Dean Pound wrote: "The powers of the Star Chamber
were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile
courts" .... The absence of substantive standards has not
necessarily meant that children receive careful,
compassionate, individualized treatment. The absence of
procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not
always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures.
Departures from established principles of due process have
frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in
arbitrariness. 22
The facts of Gault demonstrate just how dangerous giving any
judge unbridled discretion can be. One afternoon in 1964, a fifteen-yearold named Gerald Francis Gault and a friend purportedly made a prank
phone call. 23 As eloquently described by Justice Fortas, the calls "were of
the irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety." 24 At the time of the
"offense," Gerald was on probation because he had been caught in the
company of another teenager who stole a wallet. 25 Gerald was taken into
custody while both of his parents were at work. 26 No notice was left for
21

In Gault, the Court traced the historical development of juvenile delinquency court
and demonstrated that, as the consequences of a juvenile adjudication of delinquency
became more severe, procedures similar to those used in adult criminal court were
required by the Due Process Clause. 387 U.S. at 13-18.
22

Id. at 17-18.

23

Id. at 4.

24

Id. at 4-5.

2s

Id.

26

Id. at 5.
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the parents, and no attempt was made to contact them to let them know
that their son was in custody. 27 Upon learning of her son's whereabouts
from a neighbor, Gerald's mother went to the detention home, where
Gerald's probation officer told her of her son's alleged acts and informed
her that there would be a hearing the next day. 28 The probation officer
filed a petition in juvenile court that Gerald's parents did not see until a
federal habeas proceeding was brought. 29 The petition did not allege any
factual basis for the court proceeding. 30 At the "hearing" the next day, the
complainant was not present, and no transcript or written memorandum of
the proceedings was created. 31 Gerald was questioned by the judge but
was not told that he had a right to remain silent. 32 A few days later,
without explanation, Gerald was released. 33 Shortly thereafter, his parents
were notified simply that there would be another hearing. 34 Once again,
the complainant was not present, and Gerald testified without having been
advised of his constitutional rights. 35 Gerald's mother specifically
requested the presence of the complainant so that she could identify which
of the two boys had actually made the lewd remarks. 36 At the hearing, a
referral report was sent to the court by the probation officers, but was not
sent to Gerald or his parents. 37 At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge

21

Id.

2s

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id. at 6.

34

Id. at 7.

3s

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.
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committed Gerald to the State Industrial School as a juvenile delinquent
until his twenty-first birthday, "unless sooner discharged by due process of
law." 38 At no point were Gerald or his parents advised that he had a right
to counsel. 39 In essence, Gerald was sentenced to six years in juvenile
prison for a prank phone call without any notice of the charges, without
having been able to cross-examine the complainant, without knowledge
that he could remain silent, and without the advice of counsel.
In Gault, the Court reevaluated the juvenile justice system and held
that many of the fundamental protections afforded to criminal defendants
must be afforded to children facing charges in delinquency court. The
Court noted the severe consequences of a juvenile adjudication of
delinquency, and stated that "it would be extraordinary if our Constitution
did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied
in the phrase 'due process.' Under our Constitution, the condition of being
a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." 40
The Court held that due process requires that children be given
notice of the charges against them, 41 that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that children be advised of their right to counsel, that
they be provided with counsel if they cannot afford counsel, 42 that the
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments require that children be able to

38

Id. at 7-8.

39

Id. at 10.

40

Id. at 27-28.

41

Id. at 31-34 ("Due process oflaw requires notice of the sort we have describedthat is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal
proceeding. It does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth's freedom and his
parents' right to his custody are at stake without giving them timely notice, in advance of
the hearing, of the specific issues that they must meet.").
42

Id. at 34-42 ("The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems
oflaw, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings,
and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child
'requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."')
(quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
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confront and cross-examine the witnesses against them, and that children
may invoke the right against self-incrimination. 43 The Court specifically
rejected the argument that this right should not apply to children because
confession is therapeutic. 44 A few years later, the Court held that every
element of the offense charged in a petition for delinquency must be
proven to the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 45 However, a year
later, the Court held that children are not entitled to a jury in delinquency

43

Id. at 42-57 ("It would indeed be surprising ifthe privilege against selfincrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children."). While the Court
declined to rule on the child's argument that the Constitution requires appellate review of
juvenile delinquency proceedings and the right to a transcript of such proceedings, most
states provide for transcription of delinquency proceedings and appellate review of these
proceedings. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.534 (West 2007) (providing a right to
appeal from an adjudication of delinquency); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.830 (providing for written
transcripts of all proceedings in delinquency court).
44

Gault, 387 U.S. at 51 ("It is also urged ... that the juvenile and presumably his
parents should not be advised of the juvenile's right to silence because confession is good
for the child as the commencement of the assumed therapy of the juvenile court process,
and he should be encouraged to assume an attitude of trust and confidence toward the
officials of the juvenile process. This proposition has been subjected to widespread
challenge on the basis of current reappraisals of the rhetoric and realities of the handling
of juvenile offenders. In fact, evidence is accumulating that confessions by juveniles do
not aid in 'individualized treatment,' as the court below put it, and that compelling the
child to answer questions, without warning or advice as to his right to remain silent, does
not seIVe this or any other good purpose .... [I]t seems probable that where children are
induced to confess by 'paternal' urgings on the part of officials and the confession is then
followed by disciplinary action, the child's reaction is likely to be hostile and adversethe child may well feel that he has been led or tricked into confession and that despite his
confession, he is being punished.").
45

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364-69 (1970) (noting that "[t]he Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged" and that
such a right is applicable to children "during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency
proceeding").
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proceedings. 46 In most states, a juvenile judge presides over all pretrial
proceedings and the adjudicatory hearing. 47
The Court's rationale in holding that children are not entitled to a
jury in delinquency proceedings was based upon the notion that juvenile
proceedings are supposed to be rehabilitative rather than punitive. The
standard of due process required in juvenile delinquency proceedings, as
developed in Gault and Winship, is "fundamental fairness." 48 Despite
acknowledging the many flaws in the juvenile system as it existed at the
time-and acknowledging that the juvenile system could impose the
functional equivalent of prison on children-the Court held that a jury is
not required in a delinquency proceeding. The Court explained:
Concern about the inapplicability of exclusionary and other
rules of evidence, about the juvenile court judge's possible
awareness of the juvenile's prior record and of the contents
of the social file; about repeated appearances of the same
familiar witnesses in the persons of juvenile and probation
officers and social workers-all to the effect that this will
create the likelihood of pre-judgment-chooses to ignore it
seems to us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of
sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court
system contemplates. 49
While the primary purpose of juvenile court may at one point have been
rehabilitation, 50 that is no longer the case today. The legislative intent for

46

See McKeiverv. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 549-50 (1971) (holding that a jury
is not constitutionally required in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
47

See, e.g., FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.llO(c) ("The adjudicatory hearing shall be conducted
by the judge without a jury. At this hearing the court determines whether the allegations
of the petition have been sustained.").
48

See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543.

49

Id. at 550.

50

See generally Feld, supra note 12.
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the juvenile justice system in most states 51 is to protect the public from
acts of delinquency. 52 Preventing delinquency, strengthening the family,
early intervention, and rehabilitation are often listed as secondary goals of
the juvenile justice system. 53 It appears that Justice Fortas' warning in
Kent over forty years ago is more applicable today than ever: "[T]here
may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." 54

II. HISTORY OF TRANSFERRING YOUTH TO ADULT CRIMINAL
COURT

In Kent, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the
transfer statute then in effect in the District of Columbia. 55 The statute

51

A few states, however, still prioritize the rehabilitation and care of the child. See,
e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 801 (1992) (providing that each child facing delinquency
proceedings receive the "care, guidance and control that will be conducive to his
welfare"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-402 (West 1994) (providing for "individualized
accountability and individualized treatment" in the delinquency system).
52

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 19-2-102 (West 1997) ("[T]he intent ofthis
article is to protect, restore and improve the public safety by creating a system of juvenile
justice that will appropriately sanction juveniles who violate the law and, in certain cases,
will also provide the opportunity to bring together affected victims, the community and
the juvenile offenders for restorative purposes."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.02(3) (West
1997) (stating that legislative intent of the juvenile justice system is "to first protect the
public from acts of delinquency"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3 § 3085c(c)(l)(A) (2013) (stating
that a juvenile justice system should "[h]old juveniles accountable for their unlawful
conduct"); Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 938.01 (West 2009) ("It is the intent of the legislature to
promote a juvenile justice system capable of dealing with the problem of juvenile
delinquency, a system which will protect the community, impose accountability for
violations of law and equip juvenile offenders with competencies to live responsibly and
productively.").
53

See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 985.02(3)(a)-(d) (West 2014).

54

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).

55

Id. at 541.
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allowed a judge in juvenile court to transfer a case for prosecution in the
adult criminal system without holding a hearing and without giving any
reasons for her decision. 56 The Court held that this transfer procedure did
not comport with the fundamental fairness required by the Due Process
Clause, noting:
[A]s a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner was
entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the
social records and probation or similar reports which
presumably are considered by the court, and to a statement
of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision. We believe
that this result is required by the statute read in the context
of constitutional principles relating to due process and the
assistance of counsel. 57
After Kent, many states reassessed their transfer statutes and
procedures, purportedly in order to comply with the Court's ruling. The
result, however, was that many of these new statutes in effect made it
easier for the state to transfer juveniles to adult court and significantly
limited-or, in some cases, eliminated completely-the role of the
juvenile judge and the child's counsel in juvenile court. A study of state
transfer laws revealed that, "[i]n the 1980s and 1990s, legislatures in
nearly every state expanded transfer laws that allowed or required the
prosecution of juveniles in adult criminal courts." 58

56

Id.

57

Id. at 557.

58

PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, TRYING JUVENILES AS
ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 1 (2011) [hereinafter
ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS], available at
https://ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/232434.pdf. The introduction to the study explains how
difficult it is to acquire accurate statistics on the transfer of juveniles into the adult
criminal system, noting that:
[T]here are no national data sets that track youth who have been tried
and sentenced in the criminal justice system. Moreover, state data are
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Youths can be transferred to adult court in several ways. Judicial
waiver laws "allow juvenile courts to waive jurisdiction on a case-by-case
basis." 59 There are three types of judicial waiver: discretionary,
presumptive, and mandatory. 60 Typically, these statutes set forth standards
to guide the judge's discretion. 61 Some judicial waiver statutes, however,
make waiver into the adult system presumptive in certain cases and put the
burden on the defense to demonstrate why the case should remain in
juvenile court. 62 Some states go so far as to mandate judicial transfer in
certain cases. 63 Many states leave the decision to transfer a youth to the

hard to find and even more difficult to assess accurately ... Currently,
only 13 states publicly report tlle total number of their transfers, and
even fewer report offense profiles, demographic characteristics, or
details regarding processing and sentencing. Although nearly 14,000
transfers can be derived from available 2007 sources, data from 29
states are missing from tllat total.
Id.
59

Id. at 2.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 3 (noting that forty-five states have discretionary judicial waiver statutes:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Fifteen states
have presumptive judicial transfer statutes: Alaska, California, Colorado, District of
Columbia, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Utah. Fifteen states have mandatory
judicial transfer statutes: Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia).
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adult system solely in the hands of the prosecution. 64 The prosecutor is
allowed to determine whether charges will be filed in juvenile or adult
court. 65 Such statutes are commonly known as "direct file" statutes. 66 A
typical direct file statute provides criteria for discretionary and mandatory
direct file of an information in adult criminal court. 67 Fifteen states give
the prosecutor complete discretion to charge a youth directly in adult
criminal court, thereby bypassing a judicial hearing in juvenile court. 68
Finally, statutory exclusion laws give adult criminal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over certain classes of cases involving juvenile offenders. 69
Before analyzing the constitutionality of transfer statutes, it is
important to remember that the United States Supreme Court has never
acknowledged a constitutional right to be tried in juvenile court. 70 In
upholding transfer statutes, courts have relied on the fact that the right to

64

Id. at 2.

6s

Id.

66

Id. at 12. For an example of a direct file statute, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.557
(West 2011) (describing direct filing of information, as well as discretionary and
mandatory criteria).
67

Id. at 2 (noting that most transfer statutes provide broad guidelines and specific
eligibility criteria that often include age and/or a specified level of offense).
68

ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS, supra note 58, at 3 (noting that the fifteen
states with prosecutorial direct file statutes are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming).
69

Id. (noting the twenty-nine states that have statutory exclusion laws: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin).
70

See, e.g., Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1088 (1978) (stating that United States Supreme Court has never recognized a
right for juveniles to be tried in juvenile court).
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be tried in juvenile court is a right that is granted by the state legislature. 71
As such, the legislature may dictate the procedures and rights of juvenile
defendants, as long as the legislature does so in a manner that comports
with due process. 72 The Supreme Court has not yet set forth any criteria
that must be met in order to satisfy the Constitution before a youth is
transferred to adult criminal court. 73
Courts construing mandatory waiver and direct file statutes have
held them to be constitutional, despite the Supreme Court's holding in
Kent. Kent held that if a transfer hearing is held, such a hearing must
comport with due process. Courts have found that mandatory waiver and
direct file statutes do not implicate the procedures mandated by Kent
because they bypass a hearing in juvenile court entirely. For example, a
Virginia appellate court upheld a mandatory transfer statute against a
challenge by a youth on the grounds that, under Kent, he was
constitutionally entitled to a transfer hearing in juvenile court. 74 The
statute at issue provided for automatic transfer to adult court where the
juvenile court found probable cause to believe that the youth was at least
fourteen and had committed the offense of murder. 75
The youth argued that, pursuant to Kent, "he had a constitutional
right to a transfer hearing and to representation by counsel at that hearing
before being stripped of his juvenile status and being tried as an adult." 76

71

See, e.g., W.M.F. v. State, 723 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Alaska 1986) (noting that
juvenile courts are a creature of statute and, as such, the legislature can prescribe
procedures for those courts within constitutional boundaries).
n Id.
73

See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537 (1975) ("[T]he Court has never attempted to
prescribe criteria for, or the nature and quantum of evidence that must support, a decision
to transfer a juvenile for trial in adult court."); see also Stokes v. Fair, 581F.2d287, 289
(1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1078 (1979).
74

See Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 578 S.E.2d 78, 82-83 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).

75

VA. CODE ANN.§ 16.1-269.1(West2012).

76

Rodriguez, 578 S.E.2d at 80-81.
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The Virginia court distinguished Kent on the ground that the youth in that
case had a statutory right to be tried in juvenile court, whereas the Virginia
statute mandated that the youth be charged as an adult under the
circumstances. 77 The court found no constitutional right to a transfer
hearing, and limited Kent to its construction of the particular statute at
issue. 78 Essentially, the Virginia court found that, if a statute provides for a
transfer hearing, such a hearing must comport with due process, but that
the Constitution does not prevent a state from charging a juvenile directly
in adult court without a transfer hearing. 79
Given that direct file and mandatory transfer statutes have been in
existence for decades, it is unlikely that a due process challenge to these
statutes will succeed. However, the Court's evolving application of the
Eighth Amendment to juvenile punishments-which has been informed by
developmental neuroscience-might provide a new vehicle to challenge
direct file and mandatory transfer statutes.
III. THE COURT'S EVOLVING RECOGNITION OF DEVELOPMENTAL
NEUROSCIENCE AND ITS IMPACT ON EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE

As noted above, the United States Supreme Court has recently
decided several landmark cases recognizing the fundamental principle that

77

Id. at 81-83 ("[T]he Court's references to Kent's constitutional rights to due
process and counsel arose in the context of the hearing and other procedures expressly
provided for by the transfer statute at issue in that case .... Appellant has cited no
controlling legal authority providing that a juvenile defendant has a constitutional right to
a transfer hearing before being treated as an adult. The cases he cites provide, at most,
that juvenile proceedings, including transfer proceedings, when provided for by statute,
must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." (emphasis in
original)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
78

Id. at 81-83.

79

Id. at 81.
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children are different from adults. 80 Each of these cases relied to a large
extent on developing science demonstrating that children's brains function
in a fundamentally different manner than those of adults. As the Roper
Court noted, teenagers are generally less mature, more prone to reckless
behavior, and much more susceptible to negative influences than adults;
the possibility of rehabilitation is also greater for teenagers than for
adults. 81 An amicus brief relied upon by the Graham court explains
succinctly how children's brains are different. For example, even older
adolescents "are less able to restrain their impulses and exercise selfcontrol; less capable than adults of considering alternative courses of
action and maturely weighing risks and rewards; and less oriented to the
future and thus less capable of apprehending the consequences of their
often-impulsive actions." 82 Teenagers are much more likely to be
influenced by negative peers and, because they are not adults, lack the
autonomy to escape such influences even if they desire to do so. 83 Because
a significant amount of juvenile criminal behavior is attributable to the
transient characteristics of youth, research has shown that the vast
majority of youthful offenders do not continue to engage in criminal
behavior as adults. 84 Yet, as the science of juvenile brain development has

80

See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011) (holding that a child's
age must be taken into account in determining whether a child was in custody when "it
was known ... or would have been objectively apparent to the reasonable officer" for
purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Graham v. Florida, 540 U.S. 48,
82 (2010) (abolishing life without parole for children convicted of crimes other than
homicide); Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2004) (abolishing the juvenile death
penalty).
81

Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.

82

Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric
Association, National Association of Social Workers, and Mental Health America as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3-4, Graham v. Florida, 540 U.S. 48 (2010) (No.
08-7412), 2009 WL 2236778, at *4 (internal quotations omitted).
83

Id.

84

Id.
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advanced considerably, there have not been any corresponding major
changes in the way cases are transferred from delinquency court to adult
criminal court.
The Court has long recognized that cognitive functioning is
relevant to an Eighth Amendment analysis of a particular punishment. 85 In
the context of the death penalty, the Court specifically recognized that
youth is a mitigating factor that must be considered by the sentencing
jury. 86 In 1982, prior to the recent progress in developmental
neuroscience, the Supreme Court recognized the fundamental,
commonsense fact that children are different than adults. 87 The Court
stated that "the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating
factor of great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing." 88
Further, in 2002, the Court expressly recognized the link between
cognitive functioning and criminal culpability. 89 In holding that the Eighth
Amendment bars the execution of the mentally retarded, the Court held
that "[b ]ecause of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and
control of their impulses, [mentally retarded offenders] do not act with the
level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal

85

See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 607-08 (1978) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment requires a capital sentencing jury to be allowed to consider "any aspect of
the defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers for a sentence less than death"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 16364 (1976) (holding that, in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment, jury must
consider any mitigating circumstances). While Lockett and Gregg were capital cases,
their recognition that the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of any relevant
mitigating factors is applicable to the analysis that follows.
86

See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982).

87

Id. at 115-16.

88

Id. at 116.

89

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
bars the execution of the mentally retarded).
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conduct." 90 This holding provided the basis for the Court's decision in
Roper, which banned the juvenile death penalty. 91 In Roper, the Court
recognized that developmental neuroscience has demonstrated that the
brains of teenagers are fundamentally different from those of adults in
ways that directly affect culpability, 92 noting that "[t]he susceptibility of
juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means their irresponsible
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult." 93 Indeed,
"[t]he relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that
the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the
impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can
subside." 94 In Graham, the Court, relying on Roper, recognized that
"[t]hese salient characteristics mean that '[i]t is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. "' 95
In Roper, the Court relied on several scientific studies analyzing
juvenile brain development. 96 Several professional associations wrote and
submitted an amicus brief to the Roper court. 97 The amicus brief in Roper
90

Id. at 306.

91

Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).

92

Id. at 570 (noting that the personality traits of children are less formed than those
of adults).
93

Id. at 570.

94

Id.

95

Graham v. Florida, 540 U.S. 48, 73 (2010).

96

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less
Guilty by Reason ofAdolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility,
and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
97

Brief of the American Medical Association, American Psychiatric Association,
American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy of Child & Adolescent
Psychiatry, American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, National Association of
Social Workers, Missouri Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers, and
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detailed the ways in which the brains of youth differ in structure and
functioning from those of adults. The authors explained that the regions of
the brain associated with impulse control, regulation of emotions, risk
assessment, and moral reasoning are among the last to develop, and often
are not fully developed until the early to mid-twenties. 98 The authors also
found that "[p]sychosocial maturity is incomplete until age 19." 99 In a
finding of particular relevance to youth involved in the juvenile justice
system, the authors cited studies showing that "the deficiencies in the
adolescent mind and emotional and social development are especially
pronounced when other factors-such as stress, emotions and peer
pressure-enter the equation. These factors operate on an adolescent's
mind differently and with special force." 100
Further, scientists confirm that "[a]dolescents' behavioral
immaturity mirrors the anatomical immaturity of their brains." 101 Studies
have shown that adolescents rely more than adults on the amygdala, the
area of the brain associated with the primitive impulses of anger,

National Mental Health Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4,
Roperv. Sinunons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549, at *l
[hereinafter Roper Brief].
98

Id. at *4 (noting that the tests that formed the basis of its conclusions were
performed on healthy adolescents and that those in the criminal justice system often
"suffer from serious psychological disturbances that substantially exacerbate the already
existing vulnerabilities of youth, [such that] they can be expected to function at substandard levels").
99

Id. at *7 ("Adolescents score lower on measures of self-reliance and other aspects
of personal responsibility, they have more difficulty seeing things in long-term
perspective, they are less likely to look at things from the perspective of others and they
have more difficulty restraining their aggressive impulses.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
100

Id. at *7-8 ("Stress affects cognitive abilities, including the ability to weigh costs
and benefits and to override impulses with rational thought. Adolescents are more
susceptible to stress from daily events, which translates into further distortion of the
already skewed cost-benefit analysis.").
101

Id. at *10.
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aggression, and fear. 102 In contrast, adults tend to process similar
information through the frontal cortex, a cerebral area associated with
impulse control and good judgment. 103 The frontal and pre-frontal cortex,
critical areas of the brain that control impulse, judgment, risk-taking, and
weighing consequences, are among the last to develop and, often, are not
fully developed until the mid-twenties. 104
The picture below contains MRI images that demonstrate the
structural changes that take place in the brain from ages five to twenty. 105
Researchers at the National Institutes of Health, the National Institute of
Mental Health, and the University of California at Los Angeles conducted
a decade-long study using magnetic resonance imaging to track the
development of the brain. 106 The study concluded that "'higher-order'
brain centers, such as the prefrontal cortex, don't fully develop until young
adulthood as grey matter 107 wanes in a back-to-front wave as the brain
matures and neural connections are pruned." 108 In the MRI scans below,
red indicates more grey matter and blue indicates less grey matter. 109 As
any adult can attest, teenagers lack the "brakes" that keep them from

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Paul Thompson, Ph.D., MRI Images Taken From Time-Lapse Imaging Tracks
Brain Maturation from ages 5 to 20, in The Adolescent Brain-Why Teenagers Think and
Act Differently, EDINFORMATICS, (Sept. 14, 2014),
http://www.edinforrnatics.com/news/teenage_brains.htm.
106

Id.

107

Roper Brief, supra note 97, at *18-20. One of the last parts of the brain to mature
is the pre-frontal cortex. Id. at 16. This process is known as "pruning;" pruning of gray
matter improves the functioning of the brain's reasoning centers by establishing some
pathways while extinguishing others, thereby enhancing brain functioning. Id. at 18.
108

Thompson, supra note 105.

109

Id.
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engaging in impulsive and reckless activities. 110 The "brakes" are located
in the frontal lobe-the last part of the brain to develop. m Many other
changes take place in the brain between birth and adulthood. 112

As noted above, these conclusions were drawn from studies
performed on the brains of normal adolescents. Many of the youth facing
charges in delinquency court are at-risk youth who are either in foster care

110

Id.

rn Id.
112

See Roper Brief, supra note 97, at *15-17 ("[The] limbic system is more active in
adolescent brains than adult brains, particularly in the region of the amygdala and [] the
frontal lobes of the adolescent brain are less active ... [A]s teenagers grow into adults,
they increasingly shift the overall focus of brain activity to the frontal lobes ... [T]he
brain's frontal lobes are still structurally immature well into late adolescence. The
prefrontal cortex (which [is] associated with impulse control, risk assessment and moral
reasoning) is 'one of the last brain regions to mature' ... [Additionally,] [m]yelination is
the process by which the brain's axons are coated with a fatty white substance called
myelin. The presence of myelin makes communication between different parts of the
brain faster and more reliable. Myelination ... continues through adolescence and into
adulthood.").
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or unstable, often violent homes; 113 if they attend school at all, they attend
alternative schools. 114 It is also well documented that poor and minority
113

See Joseph Tulman, Disability and Delinquency: How Failures to Jdentifj;,
Accommodate and Serve Youth with Education-Related Disabilities Leads to Their
Disproportionate Representation in the Delinquency System, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD. &

FAM. ADvoc. 3, 5 (2003) ("Of the 100,000 children who are arrested and incarcerated
each year, as many as 50 percent suffer from a mental or emotional disturbance.").
Tulman powerfully summarizes the situation concerning children with education-related
disabilities in the delinquency system, noting that:
Poor educational performance among children in the delinquency
system is, in significant part, a function of the high percentage of
children in that system who have education-related disabilities and
who, more particularly, have not received the benefit of appropriate,
and effective special education services. Indeed, the majority of
children in the juvenile delinquency system are children with
education-related
disabilities.
The
delinquency
system
disproportionately attracts children with education-related disabilities
both because those children are more likely to engage in delinquent
conduct than their non-disabled peers and because the adults
responsible for educational and delinquency systems are more likely to
label and treat children with education-related disabilities as delinquent.
Poor educational outcomes that are pervasive among children in the
delinquency system constitute, in several respects, compelling evidence
that school system and delinquency system personnel are failing to
deliver appropriate educational services and failing to accommodate
children with disabilities. The outcomes also, however, often reflect
failure by school system and delinquency system personnel even to
recognize education-related disabilities. These outcomes suggest,
furthermore, that decision-makers guarding the gates to the delinquency
system generally, and to incarceration facilities particularly, treat
children with education-related disabilities differently than children
who are not disabled. In vastly disproportionate numbers, children who
are poor and who are members of racial and ethnic minority groups
populate the delinquency system. The disproportionate numbers,
moreover, reflect the harsh reality that society imposes unequal and
discriminatory treatment upon poor children of color. Researchers and
journalists have documented the disproportionate representation and
disparate, discriminatory treatment of children based upon race and
class. In contrast, disproportionate representation and disparate,
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the

delinquency

IV. CHILDREN AND TEENAGERS CANNOT FORM INTENT IN THE
SAME MANNER AS ADULTS, YET THEY ARE PROSECUTED UNDER
THE SAME STATUTES USED TO PROSECUTE ADULTS

In criminal law, the law not only punishes the alleged act, but also
the state of mind, or intent, of the defendant. For example, in Florida, a

discriminatory treatment within the delinquency system of children
with disabilities has not been sufficiently studied and documented.
Estimates of the correlation between delinquency and disabilities vary
widely.

Id. at 4-5.
114

The term "alternative school" is used to describe schools where students are
transferred for disciplinary reasons or because they have been suspended or expelled
from mainstream schools. See Maureen Carroll, Racialized Assumptions and
Constitutional Harm: Claims ofInjury Based on Public School Assignment, 83 TEMP. L.
REV. 903, 904 (2011) ("In a typical disciplinary transfer case, the student has been
involuntary [sic] transferred from a mainstream school to an alternative program without
the procedural safeguards that accompany formal expulsions. Many alternative schools
used for this purpose have limited classroom instruction, strict disciplinary procedures,
and no extracurricular activities. Often, the only students attending an alternative school
are those placed involuntarily for disciplinary or remedial reasons. Students attending
disciplinary programs face a dramatically higher risk of violence than those attending
mainstream schools. Moreover, because of curricular differences, students returning to a
mainstream school from an alternative program may be unable to advance to the next
grade or to graduate with their peers.").

See HEIDI M. HSIA ET AL., u. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DISPROPORTIONATE
MINORITY CONFINEMENT 2002 UPDATE iii (2004) ("Although minority youth account for
about one-third of the U.S. juvenile population, they comprise two-thirds of the juvenile
detention/corrections population."); see also CARLE. POPE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE DELINQUENCY AND
PREVENTION, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE
RESEARCH LITERATURE FROM 1989 THROUGH 2001 (2002).
115
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premeditated murder committed in the course of certain enumerated
felonies is a capital crime. 116 By contrast, a homicide that occurs during
one of the enumerated felonies "without any design to effect death" is a
second-degree felony with a maximum fifteen-year sentence. 117 There is
no requirement in the law that courts evaluate a child's ability to form
criminal intent before the child is transferred to adult court.
Many children facing charges in delinquency court are also in
dependency proceedings, meaning that they have been abused, abandoned,
or neglected by their parent(s). 118 Many other juvenile defendants have
been victims of serious-often violent-physical, sexual, and emotional
abuse. 119 This type of abuse has a direct impact on the functioning of the
areas of the brain that control impulsive, risky, and unlawful behavior. 120
Even before recent advances in neuroscience, psychologists
recognized that adolescents do not form intent in the same manner as
adults. As Dr. Marty Beyer, a leading expert in the area, explained:
"[f]rom a psychological perspective, intention in children is a complex
area, particularly considering their limited capacity to think ahead to the
unforeseen long-term consequences of their immediate action." 121
Critically, Dr. Beyer concluded "that from the standpoint of cognitive
development, young people have diminished capacity to intend harm to

116

FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 782.04(l)(a) (West 2014).

117

FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 775.082(6)(d) (West 2014).

118

See generally Denise C. Herz et. al., Challenges Facing Crossover Youth: An
Examination ofJuvenile-Justice Decision Making and Recidivism, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 305
(2010).
119

Id.

120

See U.S. DEP'TOFHEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS, UNDERSTANDlNGTHEEFFECTS
OF MAL TREATMENT ON BRAIN DEVELOPMENT (2009), available at
https://www .childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue_briefs/brain_development/effects.cfm.
121

Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, 7 KY. CHILD. RTS. J. 16,
18 (1999) ("Carrying a weapon and even using a weapon does not mean a child had adult
intent to harm.").
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others or ant1c1pate harm as an unintended consequence of their
actions." 122 Teenagers often demonstrate a disconnect between their
actions and the resulting consequence. 123 Many teenagers see their
behavior as the only option in a certain situation, but fail to recognize their
responsibility for putting themselves in the situation in the first place. 124
This "adolescent disconnect goes to the heart of culpability and results
from an immature thought process (not anticipating unintended
consequences; reacting to threat) and incomplete moral development." 125
Abuse, trauma, and neglect further impact a young person's ability
to form intent, as these factors can significantly alter brain development. 126
This abuse includes emotional abuse. 127 After conducting extensive
research, Dr. Martin Teicher concluded that "early maltreatment, even
exclusively psychological abuse, has enduring negative effects on brain
development." 128 In an observation particularly relevant to the appropriate
punishment for young offenders, Dr. Teicher explained:
Physical, sexual, and psychological trauma in childhood
may lead to psychiatric difficulties that show up in
childhood, adolescence, or adulthood. The victim's anger,
shame, and despair can be directed inward to spawn
symptoms such as depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation,
and post-traumatic stress, or directed outward as

122

Id.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

at

18.

at

18-19.

See Martin Teicher, Wounds that Time Won't Heal: The Neurobiology of Child
Abuse, 2 CEREBRUM (The Dana F. on Brain Sci., New York N.Y.), 2000, at 1.
127

Id.

12s

Id.
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aggression, impulsiveness, delinquency, hyperactivity, and
substance abuse. 129
Some of the disorders strongly associated with child abuse are those that
may cause unlawful behavior, such as borderline personality disorder or
dissociative identity disorder. 130 Similarly, victims of child abuse may
suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), the symptoms of
which include "irritability or outbursts of anger" and "an exaggerated
startle response." 131 Dr. Teicher argues that "the trauma of abuse induces a
cascade of effects, including changes in hormones and neurotransmitters
that mediate development of vulnerable brain regions." 132 Dr. Teicher and
other scientists have identified "a constellation of brain abnormalities
associated with child abuse," including limbic irritability, 133 deficient
development, differentiation of the left hemisphere, 134 deficient left-right
hemisphere interaction, 135 and abnormal activity in the cerebellar vermis
(the middle strip between the two hemispheres of the brain). 136 Of
particular relevance here are the effects of abuse on the development of

i29

Id. at3.

130

Id.

m

Id.

132

Id. at 6.

133

Id. at 5-6 ("[Limbic irritability is] manifested by markedly increased prevalence
of symptoms suggestive of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) and by an increased incidence
of clinically significant EEG (brain wave) abnormalities.").
134

Id. at 6 ("[This process is] manifested throughout the cerebral cortex and the
hippocampus, which is involved in memory retrieval.").
135

Id. ("[This process is] indicated by marked shifts in hemispheric activity during
memory recall and by underdevelopment of the middle portions of the coipus callosum,
the primary pathway connecting the two hemispheres.").
136

Id. ("[This] appears to play an important role in emotional and attentional balance
and regulates electrical activity within the limbic system.").
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the hippocampus, which is involved in regulating memory and emotion. 137
Dr. Teicher's findings demonstrate that child abuse has a direct impact on
the ability of a youthful offender to form intent:
To be convicted of a crime in the United States, one
supposedly must have the capacity to both know right from
wrong and to control one's behavior. Those with a history
of childhood abuse may know right from wrong, but their
brains may be so irritable and the connections from the
logical, rational hemispheres so weak that intense negative
(right-hemisphere) emotions may incapacitate their use of
logic and reason to control their aggressive impulses. Is it
just to hold people criminally responsible for acts they lack
the neurological capacity to control? 138
While studies demonstrate that every child's brain develops
differently, and that such development directly impacts the child's ability
to form intent and, ultimately, the appropriate punishment for the child's
offense, the decision about whether to transfer a case to adult court is often
made by a prosecutor who knows only the facts of the crime. As shown
below, the Eighth Amendment requires that all relevant factors-including
cognitive functioning, brain development, child abuse and neglect,
educational neglect, mental illness, and many others unique to each child's
case-be considered by a neutral trier of fact before a child is prosecuted
as an adult.

137

Id. ("Cells in the hippocampus have an unusually large number of receptors that
respond to the stress hormone cortisol. Since animal studies show that exposure to high
levels of stress hormones like cortisol has toxic effects on the developing hippocampus,
this brain region may be adversely affected by severe stress in childhood.").
Bs Id.
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V. APPLICATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE TO MANDATORY TRANSFER AND DIRECT FILE
STATUTES

Analyzing mandatory transfer and direct file statutes implicates
both the due process issues addressed in the early cases governing
procedure in juvenile court and Eighth Amendment 139 jurisprudence
recognizing the impact of brain development on the proportionality of a
particular punishment. Yet, only a handful of courts have addressed the
Eighth Amendment issue, 140 and in each of these cases, an Eighth
Amendment challenge based on Roper and Graham failed. 141 However,
none of these cases conducted an in-depth Eight Amendment analysis. A
number of Illinois cases upheld that state's mandatory transfer statute on
the grounds that the statute did not itself impose a punishment; therefore,
the Eighth Amendment was not implicated. 142 Similarly, an Arizona court

139

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punislunents inflicted.").
140

See State v. Vasquez, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0371, 2012 WL 112668, at *l (Ariz.
Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2012); People v. Pacheco, 991N.E.2d896, 906--08 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)
(holding that mandatory transfer does not impose a punislunent and does not implicate
the Eighth Amendment); People v. Jackson, 965 N.E.2d 623, 631-32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)
(same); People v. Salas, 961N.E.2d831, 846-47 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (same).
141

See Vasquez, 2012 WL 112668, at *l; Pacheco, 991 N.E.2d at 906--08; Jackson,
965 N.E.2d at 631-32; Salas, 961 N.E.2d at 846-47.
142

See Pacheco, 991 N.E.2d at 907; Jackson, 965 N.E. 2d at 632 ("The automatic
transfer provision does not dictate any form of punislunent as that term is used
throughout criminal statutes. Because the automatic transfer provision does not mandate
or even suggest a punislunent, any analysis as to whether or not it violated the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punislunent is futile. The automatic
transfer provision does not impose any punislunent. Therefore, it is not subject to the
Eighth Amendment."); Salas, 961 N.E.2d at 845-46 ("[T]he automatic transfer statute at
issue here does not impose any punislunent on the juvenile defendant, but rather it only
provides a mechanism for determining where defendant's case is to be tried, i.e., it
provides for the forum in which his guilt may be adjudicated. The punislunent imposed
on defendant here, specifically, his 50-year sentence of imprisonment, was made pursuant
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held that while transfer exposed a juvenile to a greater punishment, the
transfer itself was not a punishment, and, as a result, did not implicate the
Eighth Amendment. 143
Yet a statute does not have to impose a criminal sentence in order
to be considered punitive for Eighth Amendment purposes. 144 In the
seminal case of Trap v. Dulles, the Supreme Court recognized that
whether a statute is penal or not cannot be determined simply by its
label. 145 As Justice Warren wryly noted: "[h]ow simple would be the tasks
of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if specific problems
could be solved by inspection of the labels pasted on them!" 146 In
determining if a statute is penal, the "Court has generally based its
determination upon the purpose of the statute. If the statute imposes a
disability for the purposes of punishment-that is, to reprimand the
wrongdoer, to deter others, etc., it has been considered penal." 147 A statute
is non-penal if "it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish
some other legitimate governmental purpose." 148

to the Unified Code of Corrections and not pursuant to the automatic transfer statute. As
the automatic transfer statute does not impose any punishment, it is not subject to the
Eighth Amendment.").
143

Vasquez, 2012 WL 112668, at *3 ("Although being tried as an adult exposes the
juvenile offender to the risk of more severe punishment than being adjudicated in the
juvenile system, the transfer itself is not a form of punishment for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment. Thus, the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual
punishment is simply not implicated by the transfer itself.").
144

See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1958).

145

Id. at 94-95.

146

Id. at 94.

147

Id. at 96.

148

Id. at 96-97 ("The Court has recognized that any statute decreeing some adversity
as a consequence of certain conduct may have both a penal and a nonpenal effect. The
controlling nature of such statutes normally depends on the evident purpose of the
legislature. The point may be illustrated by the situation of an ordinary felon. A person
who commits a bank robbery, for instance, loses his right to liberty and often his right to
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Mandatory transfer and direct file statutes impose an increased
punishment for penal purposes: to punish the wrongdoer and to deter
others. A youth transferred to adult court faces a potential sentence that is
decades longer than what she would face in juvenile court, is housed in an
adult jail (although, some states require that juveniles remain separated
from adults), is considered an adult for purposes of any other pending
charges, and, may remain detained prior to trial significantly longer than
would be allowed in juvenile court. 149 The decision to transfer a youth to
adult criminal court is made based primarily on the charge 150 and the
youth's history in delinquency court. 151 In fact, in cases of mandatory
vote. If, in the exercise of the power to protect banks, both sanctions were imposed for
the purpose of punishing bank robbers, the statutes authorizing both disabilities would be
penal. But because the purpose of the latter statute is to designate a reasonable ground of
eligibility for voting, this law is sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate
the franchise.").
149

See generally ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS, supra note 58.

150

See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 985.556(4)(c) (West 2014) (decision to transfer child to
adult court based upon seriousness of offense, aggressiveness, willfulness or violence of
the offense, whether offense was against a person or property, probable cause, whether
any co-defendants are adults or children, child's sophistication and maturity, child's
previous history and record and prospects for rehabilitation); Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541 (1966).
151

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West 1996) ("Evidence of the following factors
shall be considered, and findings with regard to each factor shall be made in the record, in
assessing whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice: the age and social
background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the
juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and
psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to
such efforts; the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral
problems. In considering the nature of the offense, as required by this paragraph, the
court shall consider the extent to which the juvenile played a leadership role in an
organization, or otherwise influenced other persons to take part in criminal activities,
involving the use or distribution of controlled substances or firearms. Such a factor, if
found to exist, shall weigh in favor of a transfer to adult status, but the absence of this
factor shall not preclude such a transfer."); see also Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.
4th 537, 565--67 (Cal. 2002) (noting that direct file provisions typically give both juvenile
and adult criminal courts the power to hear cases involving certain juveniles-
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transfer, the transfer is dictated solely by the nature of the offense. 152
There is no mandate for the state or any court to consider mitigating
factors. 153
In Trap, the Court made it clear that any statute that imposes a
disability for the purposes of punishment-that is, to reprimand the
wrongdoer or to deter others-is penal. 154 Clearly, the purpose of transfer
is at once to reprimand the wrongdoer and deter others. The Supreme
Court itself noted that, "[i]t is clear beyond dispute that the waiver of
jurisdiction is a 'critically important' action determining vitally important
statutory rights of the juvenile." 155 As noted above, the transfer decision is
made primarily based on the offense and the youth's delinquency history.
It would be entirely disingenuous to argue that a transfer statute that
exposes a youth to sentence of fifty, sixty, or seventy years in adult prison
rather than several years in a juvenile program has a purpose other than
punishment. While the language of the transfer statute itself may not
impose a punishment, mandatory transfer and direct file statutes are
indisputably penal in nature and are subject to Eighth Amendment
scrutiny.
The purpose of the Eighth Amendment is not solely to prohibit
torture and extreme forms of punishment. Rather, it embodies "broad and
idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and

particularly those of a certain age, those with certain offending histories, and/or those
accused of certain offenses-and leave it up to prosecutors to make discretionary
decisions regarding where to file them).
152

See ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS, supra note 58, at 4 (noting that fifteen
states require transfer to adult criminal court in cases that meet "specified age/offense or
prior record criteria").
153

Id. (describing mandatory transfer criteria and omitting any reference to
mitigation).
154

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).

155

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
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decency ... against which [courts] must evaluate penal measures." 156 The
Graham court specifically recognized that "[a]n offender's age is relevant
to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take
defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed." 157 In
Roper, the Court explained that "[r]etribution is not proportional if the
law's most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or
blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth
and immaturity." 158 While transfer is not the most severe penalty, a
sentence of fifty years is essentially a life term and falls well within
Graham's proscription of such sentences. As noted above, two "virtual
life" cases are currently pending before the Florida Supreme Court and
other similar challenges have been made across the country. 159
While courts in Illinois and Arizona have held that a transfer
statute itself does not impose a particular punishment, a close examination
of the law demonstrates that that is not, in fact, the case. In Florida, for
example, a seventeen-year-old charged with a second-degree felony 160
would face a maximum sentence of commitment to a juvenile program
until his nineteenth birthday, while the same youth would face up to
fifteen years in adult prison if transferred to adult court. 161 If the court

156

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
157

Graham v. Florida, 540 U.S. 48, 76 (2010).

158

Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2004).

159

See Gridine v. Florida, 89 So. 3d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), rev. granted by
Gridine v. Florida, 103 So. 3d 139, No. SC12-1223, 2012 WL 4839014, at *l (Fla. Oct.
11, 2012); Henry v. Florida, 82 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), rev. granted by
Henry v. Florida, 107 So. 3d 405, No. SC12-578, 2012 WL 5991345, at *l (Fla. Nov. 6,
2012).
160

See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 810.02(3) (West 2011) (noting that a common offense for
juveniles is burglary of a dwelling, which is a second-degree felony in Florida).
161

See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 775.082(3)(c) (West 2014) (noting that the exact sentence
of a juvenile is determined by the Department of Corrections using a complicated score
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adjudicated the youth as a "youthful offender," the maximum term in
prison would be reduced to six years. 162 Therefore, by virtue of sentencing
laws, a transfer to adult court, in and of itself, imposes a significantly
longer sentence than a child faces if tried in juvenile court. As the court
noted in Trap, the Eighth Amendment applies to any cruel and unusual
sentence, and "the existence of the death penalty is not a license to the
Government to devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its
.
.
.
"163
1magmat10n.
Applying the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to
mandatory transfer and direct file statutes leads to the conclusion that such
statutes are unconstitutional. The Court's recognition of the diminished
culpability of juvenile offenders and the impact that other individualized
factors, such as cognitive function and social history, have on culpability
requires an individualized hearing before a juvenile judge before a case
can be transferred to adult criminal court for prosecution. Proponents of
direct file and mandatory transfer point to the fact that the Supreme Court
looks at legislative trends when evaluating "evolving standards of
decency" 164 for Eighth Amendment purposes and note that no state has
implemented mandatory transfer hearings. However, every state has
recognized through its statutes that age is relevant to the transfer decision.
With a few exceptions, every state has a minimum age for transfer. 165 In
addition, while the Court looks to state legislatures for indications as to
"evolving standards of decency," the Court has made it clear that "the
Constitution contemplates that the Court's own judgment be brought to
sheet. Depending on the youth's history, it is likely that the child will face a sentence of
at least ten years if charged as an adult).
162

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 958.04(2)(d) (West 2008).

163

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).

164

Jd.; see also Graham v. Florida, 540 U.S. 48, 76 (2010) (same); Roperv.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566--67 (2004) (evaluating legislative trends in standards of
decency).
165

See ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS, supra note 58, at 4 (reporting that
most, but not all, transfer statutes require a minimum age for transfer to adult court).
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bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty." 166 The same
reasoning applies to mandatory transfer and direct file statutes. It is not at
all certain that the Court would conclude that current transfer statutes
indicate a consensus among American citizens that a fourteen-year-old
should face a fifty-year sentence. The issue involves complex questions of
proportionality,
developmental
neuroscience,
rehabilitation,
and
deterrence. These are issues with which most Americans are not familiar.
Moreover, in evaluating the constitutionality of a particular punishment,
the Court looks at the goals of the punishment at issue. 167 Typically, the
goals of a criminal statute are retribution and deterrence. 168 Studies have
shown that juveniles transferred to adult court have a higher recidivism
rate than juveniles adjudicated in the juvenile delinquency system. 169
Just as a penalty-phase jury must be allowed to consider any
mitigating factor that could result in a sentence less than death, a juvenile
judge presiding over a transfer hearing should consider all relevant factors,
including the child's social history, mental health, cognitive functioning,
and any other relevant factors. Florida allows direct file for certain
offenses for children as young as fourteen. 170 As both common sense and
166

Roper, 543 U.S. at 552.

167

See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (discussing the goals of the
death penalty, retribution and deterrence, as applied to intellectually disabled offenders).
168

Id.; see also Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (noting that the
traditional goals of punishment are retribution and deterrence).
169

See Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to
Delinquency?, in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN 3
(2010), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/220595.pdf.
170

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.557(1) (West 2011) (providing that the State is able to
directly file fourteen- and fifteen-year olds charged with a list of offenses including, inter
alia: arson, sexual battery, robbery, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated
assault, aggravated stalking, murder, manslaughter, and aggravated battery). In
considering the list of offenses, it is important to note the difference in the severity of the
offenses. Aggravated assault, for example, is assault with a deadly weapon absent the
intent to kill. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.021. "Deadly weapon" has been defined very
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developmental neuroscience indicate, not all fourteen-year-olds are the
same. The author of this article had a client who was direct filed at
fourteen for his second offense (the first was petit theft). The charge was
armed burglary of a dwelling. The facts indicated that the youth had gone
along with his older brother and other adults after his older brother picked
him up from school. While the offense is, of course, serious, there was no
injury to the victim. Had a transfer hearing been held, defense counsel
would have put forth evidence demonstrating the youth's lack of criminal
history, his relative youth compared to the other defendants, the fact that
his brother picked him up from school and drove him to the scene, and the
fact that, while chronologically fourteen, school records indicated an
intellectual disability that caused him to function several years behind his
chronological age. Because Florida allows discretionary direct file,
however, none of this evidence was presented. The youth was transferred
to adult court and faces a very uncertain future.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this article has attempted to demonstrate that direct
file and mandatory transfer statutes do not survive Eighth Amendment
scrutiny. The cases that have upheld such statutes against an Eighth
Amendment challenge have mistakenly relied on the form of the statute
rather than its actual impact. Given the Court's recent jurisprudence,
which recognizes that a child's mental capabilities are fundamentally
different from those of an adult, the Eighth Amendment requires
individual transfer hearings that comport with due process before a
juvenile can be transferred to adult criminal court.

broadly by the Florida courts. See FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIM. CASES§
82 ("[A] weapon is a 'deadly weapon' if it is used or threatened to be used in a way likely
to produce death or great bodily harm."). The author has seen juveniles charged with
aggravated assault where the "deadly weapon" was a chair, a bicycle, and a lamp.
Common sense dictates that there is a substantial difference between throwing a chair and
murder.

